Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1989

Sheldon L. Pollack Corporation, Norbert W. Pieper,
A.I.A, Inc v. Heritage Mountain Development
Company : Reply Brief of Appellants
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
David R. Olsen; Carl F. Huefner; Michael W. Homer; Suitter; Axland; Armstrong & Hanson;
Richard L. Hill; Jeffrey R. Hill; Olsen; Hintze; Nielson & Hill; Attorneys for Defendants.
David M. Wahlquist; Merrill F. Nelson; Kirton; McConkie & Bushnell; Attorneys for PlaintiffsAppellants .
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Sheldon L. Pollack Corporation v. Heritage Mountain Development Company, No. 890284 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1989).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/1863

This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
BRIEF
UTAH
DOCUMENT
KFU
50
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
.A10
D
SHELDON L. POLLACK CORPORATION,
a California corporation; and
NORBERT W. PIEPER, A.I.A., INC.
a California corporation,
Case No. 860631
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
(Category No. 14b)
vs.
HERITAGE MOUNTAIN DEVELOPMENT
COMPANY, a Utah corporation,
et al.

P^-O? S4-CA

Defendants-Respondents.
APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF

APPEAL FROM A FINAL ORDER OF THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT
OF UTAH COUNTY, JUDGE GEORGE E. BALLIF

David R. Olsen
Carl F. Huefner
Michael W. Homer
SUITTER, AXLAND, ARMSTRONG &
HANSON
175 South West Temple, #700
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

David M. Wahlquist, #3349
Merrill F. Nelson, #3841
KIRTON, McCONKIE & BUSHNELL
330 South Third East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for PlaintiffsAppellants

Attorneys for Guaranty Savings
and Loan Association
Richard L. Hill
Jeffrey R. Hill
OLSEN, HINTZE, NIELSON & HILL
3319 North University, #200
Provo, Utah 84062
Attorneys for Heritage Mountain
Development

r.;AY i .
[Jfnft

DATE DUE
&P » t

J'

1

1
1

OAYUJfO

1 VHWIEDIMttBA

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
SHELDON L. POLLACK CORPORATION,
a California corporation; and
NORBERT W. PIEPER, A.I.A., INC.,
a California corporation,
Case No. 860631
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
(Category No. 14b)
vs.
HERITAGE MOUNTAIN DEVELOPMENT
COMPANY, a Utah corporation,
et al.
Defendants-Respondents.
APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF

APPEAL FROM A FINAL ORDER OF THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT
OF UTAH COUNTY, JUDGE GEORGE E. BALLIF

David R. Olsen
Carl F. Huefner
Michael W. Homer
SUITTER, AXLAND, ARMSTRONG &
HANSON
175 South West Temple, #700
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorneys for Guaranty Savings
and Loan Association
Richard L. Hill
Jeffrey R. Hill
OLSEN, HINTZE, NIELSON & HILL
3319 North University, #200
Provo, Utah 84062
Attorneys for Heritage Mountain
Development

David M. Wahlquist, #3349
Merrill F. Nelson, #3841
KIRTON, McCONKIE & BUSHNELL
330 South Third East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for PlaintiffsAppellants

TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

ii

REPLY TO STATEMENT OF FACTS

1

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

1

ARGUMENT

2

POINT I:

ARCHITECTS' LIENS ATTACH ON THE DATE THE
ARCHITECTURAL WORK IS COMMENCED
2
A. Utah Law
2
B. Other Jurisdictions
7
POINT II: THE NOVEMBER 1982 FORECLOSURE JUDGMENT
ON THE FEE PROPERTY DOES NOT PRECLUDE
RELATION BACK OF THE ARCHITECTS* LIENS
TO VISIBLE, PRE-FORECLOSURE IMPROVEMENTS
ON THE LEASED AND PERMIT PROPERTIES . . . 10
POINT III: RESPONDENTS ARE PRECLUDED FROM
CHALLENGING THE EXTENT OF PROPERTY
COVERED BY THE ARCHITECTS' LIENS
BECAUSE THEY FAILED TO FILE A CROSSAPPEAL

12

CONCLUSION

13

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases

Page

Aladdin Heating Corp._v. Trustees,
93~Nev. 257, 563 P.2d 82 (1977)

9

Calder Bros. Co. v. Anderson,
652 P. 2d 922 (~Utah 1982)

5

CIark v. General Electric Co.,
243 Ark. 399, 420 S.W.2d 830 (1967)

8

Duekett v. Olsen,
699 P. 2d 734 (Utah 1985)

10

First of Denver Mort. Investors v. C.N. Zundel and Associates,
600 P.2d 521 (Utah 1979)
4, 10
Frank J. Klein & Sons, Inc. v. Laudeman,
270 Md. 152, 311 A.2d 780 (1973)

11

Labrum v. Rickenbach,
711 P.2d 225 (Utah 1985)

12

Mabey v. Kay Peterson Constr. Co.,
682 P.2d 287 (Utah 1984)

12

Reuben E. Johnson Co. v. Phelps,
279 Minn. 107, 156 N.W.2d 247 (1968)

8

Walker v. Lytton Savings and Loan Ass'n,
84 Cal. Rptr. 521, 465 P.2d 497 (1970)

8

Western Mortgage Loan Corp. v. Cottonwood Constr. Co.,
18 Utah 2d 409, 424~P.2d 437 (1967)

5

Williams & Works, Inc. v. Springfield Corp.,
408 Mich. 732/293 N.W.2d 304 (1980)

8, 9

Zions First National Bank v. Carlson,
23 Utah 2d 395, 464 P.2d 387 (1970)

2, 4, 7

Other Authorities
57 C.J.S., Mechanics' Liens §§144,180
11
Comment, "The Utah Law of Mechanics' Liens," 1966 Utah L.Rev. 181 4
U.C.A. §38-1-3
2
§38-1-5
passim
§38-1-10
4
§38-1-11
11
Colo. Rev. Stat §38-22-106( 1) (1973)
8

REPLY TO STATEMENT OF FACTS
The parties are in general agreement as to the material
facts.

However, respondent Guaranty Savings and Loan

Association ("Guaranty") unnecessarily complicates the issues
with immaterial facts regarding the various trust deeds.
Br. at 8-9.)

(Resp.

The preliminary trust deeds in April and June of

1983 were both released and superseded by the final trust deed
to Guaranty recorded September 15, 1983.

(R. 1152.)

Guaranty's

entire interest in the resort property is now held by virtue of
the September trust deed alone.

Guaranty's priority claim in

the district court was based on the September trust deed (R.
1266, 1272), and the district court's ruling was based on the
September trust deed (Appellant's Add. 2, 5 ) . Accordingly, in
deciding the relative lien priorities in this appeal, it should
be kept clearly in mind that Guaranty's lien attachment date is
September 15, 1983.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Architects have a valid lien for their services, and both
the language and purpose of the lien priority statute require
that it attach from the date the architectural work is begun.
In any event, the architects' liens relate back to visible
construction pre-dating the lender's trust deed.

Neither the

1982 foreclosure judgment on the fee parcel nor the temporary
suspension of construction bars relation back of the architects1
liens to prior visible construction on the resort Property.

Guaranty is precluded from challenging the extent of the
property covered by the architects' liens because it failed to
file a cross-appeal challenging the district court's ruling that
the liens applied to the entire property.
ARGUMENT
POINT I:
A.

ARCHITECTS' LIENS ATTACH ON THE DATE THE
ARCHITECTURAL WORK IS COMMENCED.

Utah Law
Guaranty does not dispute that architects are entitled to

a lien for the value of their services whether or not on-site
construction is ever commenced.

See U.C.A. §38-1-3; Zions First

National Bank v. Carlson, 23 Utah 2d 395, 464 P.2d 387, 388
(1970).

Guaranty argues that the architect's lien, as with all

mechanics liens, attaches only upon commencement of visible,
on-site improvements.

(Resp. Br. at 12.)

However, that

argument runs contrary to the plain language of the lien
priority statute and expands this Court's decisions beyond their
intended limits.
U.C.A. §38-1-5 clearly provides for different lien
attachment points depending upon the type of work being done.
It says that liens "take effect" or attach at "the time of
commencement to do work or furnish materials on the ground."
Subsequent language in the statute makes the distinction even
more clear, giving mechanics1 liens priority over mortgages that
attached subsequently "to the time when the building,
improvement or structure was commenced, work begun, or first
material furnished on the ground."
-2-

Guaranty emphasizes the

phrase "on the ground," but that phrase modifies only "material
furnished," not "work begun."

As noted in Zions, supra, the

lien statute "was purposely broad in order to give a lien for
the drawing of plats, plans, maps or specifications which is not
done directly upon the property."

464 P.2d at 388, emp. added.

Since architectural work is never done "on the ground," section
38-1-5 must be construed to allow architects1 liens to attach
when the architectural "work [is] begun."
Guaranty surprisingly calls this a "tortured
interpretation" of section 38-1-5 (Resp. Br. at 19 n.4), but
that characterization more accurately describes Guaranty's
proposed construction.

Guaranty would rewrite the statute to

favor lenders over laborers, to give all mechanics' liens effect
from the date of "commencement of work on the ground."
Br. at 15.)

(Resp.

But what is the attachment date of those statutory

liens if on-site construction is never commenced?

Guaranty

proposes priority "from the date of recording of the lien
itself" (Resp. Br. at 18); the only problem is, section 38-1-5
says nothing about measuring priority from the date of filing.
Such a drastic alteration of the statute must obviously be left
to the Legislature.

Thus, under Guaranty's interpretation of

38-1-5, architects would have no lien protection where
construction, for no fault of theirs, is never commenced,

Note that Guaranty's quotation of section 38-1-5 is
incomplete and omits the word "work" in the crucial phrase "work
begun." (Resp. Br. at 12-13.)

o

a result directly contrary to the holding in Zions.

And even

where construction is commenced, Guaranty's interpretation of
38-1-5 would require attachment of architects1 liens to be
delayed beyond the time when their lienable services are
performed and would thus result in treating architects
2
differently from all other lienholders under the statute.
Guaranty argues that the "equal footing" doctrine
embodied in section 38-1-10 precludes attachment of architects1
liens from the date* of commencement of the architectural work
because other mechanics' liens will attach at different times.
(Resp. Br. at 29-31.)

While section 38-1-5 provides for

different points of lien attachment depending upon the type of
lienable work performed, for purposes of lien priority relative
to non-mechanicsf liens, all mechanics1 liens have the same
priority.

See First of Denver Mort. Investors v. C.N. Zundel

and Associates, 600 P.2d 521, 527 (Utah 1979.)

Thus, equal

Guaranty cites a law review comment in support of its
position that no liens attach until visible construction
commences. (Resp. Br. at 17.) However, Guaranty omitted the
language to the contrary:
Since a difficult factual determination must be made
under the "visible to the eye" test, there is much
uncertainty created in regard to the priority of
mechanics' and mortgage liens. There is a definite need
for a point in time upon which interested parties can
rely for purposes of establishing priority, and it seems
that the "visible to the eye" test does not fulfill this
need.
Comment, "The Utah Law of Mechanics' Liens," 1966 Utah L. Rev.
181, 188. For architects' liens, that point in time is when the
architectural work is commenced.

-4-

footing is preserved.

Lenders with liens inferior to the

mechanics1 liens will accordingly take steps to ensure that all
mechanics1 lien holders are paid from the construction loan
proceeds, a result consistent with the protective purpose of the
mechanics1 lien law.

(App. Br. at 7.)

Neither does Utah case law go so far as to require
visible, on-site construction before any mechanic's lien may
attach.

Guaranty relies primarily on Calder Bros. Co. v.

Anderson, 652 P.2d 922 (Utah 1982), and Western Mortgage Loan
Corp. v. Cottonwood Constr. Co., 18 Utah 2d 409, 424 P.2d 437
(1967), for its visible construction argument; however, neither
case stands for the proposition Guaranty asserts.

In Calder

Bros., the mechanics' liens were held inferior to the mortgage
lien not because the mechanics' work was not visible on the
site, but because the work was only "ordinary maintenance or
cleanup work" and did not constitute "commencement of an
improvement to the building." 652 P.2d at 924-25.

Similarly,

Western Mortgage held that the mechanics' liens on a particular
home in a subdivision could not relate back to the installation
of utility lines and roads for the entire subdivision, not
because those general improvements were not visible, but because
"[t]he erection of the home was separate and severable from the
early work in developing the subdivision." 424 P.2d at 439.

By

contrast, the architects' work in the present case was extensive
and detailed, covering every aspect of the long-term development
of the entire resort property.

It constituted an essential,

-5-

integral part of the resort development.

Therefore, the

architects1 liens should have priority over Guaranty's trust
deed without regard to commencement of on-site construction, as
contemplated by 38-1-5.
The prior decisions of this Court do recognize the notice
function served by measuring certain mechanics' liens from the
date of commencement of on-site construction or delivery of
material "on the ground."

However, those decision are not

intended to be all-inclusive so as to preclude an architect's
lien from attaching when the architectural work is begun.

While

Zions did not decide the relative priority of an architect's
lien as against competing lien holders, it did hold that the
architect's lien may attach prior to actual construction or
furnishing of materials.

In any event, lenders typically have

actual notice of prior architectural work, as Guaranty concedes
(Resp. Br. at 20), and as occurred in this case (App. Br. at
16).

Therefore, with respect to architects' liens, actual

construction or furnishing of materials on the ground is not
required to give lenders notice that an architect's lien has
attached.

With actual notice of an architect's lien, the lender

can take the necessary steps or precautions to preserve its
3
first priority status.

Guaranty asserts that architects should not expect
statutory protection, but should protect themselves by demanding
payment in advance or from the construction loan. (Resp. Br. at
21 n.6.) However, Guaranty well knows the implausibility of
advance payment on a project like this where the fees for
architectural services run into the millions of dollars. As for
payment from the loan proceeds, that is exactly what the
architects expected and were promised, but were not given.
-6-

Finally, Guaranty makes the policy argument that lender
funds will dry up if architects' liens are given priority over
subsequently recorded trust deeds.

(Resp. Br. at 20 n.5.)

However, that is pure conjecture and has not occurred in states
like Colorado that give architects1 liens priority as of the
date the architectural work is commenced.

It is just as likely,

if the trust deed is given priority, that architectural services
f^r such developments will be unavailable because architects
will refuse to work without assurance of future payment.

The

memorandum of "adverse effects" under an unrelated law, cited in
Resp. Br. at 20 n.5, is not part of the record and may not be
considered on this appeal.
In sum, under the language of section 38-1-5 and this
Court's decision in Zions, architects' liens attach and have
priority from the date the architectural work is commenced.
There is no Utah case or valid policy reason to the contrary.
B.

Other Jurisdictions
Appellants' Brief, pp. 12-15, demonstrates that Utah's

lien priority statute originates from Colorado, and that
Colorado case law should therefore be persuasive in resolving
this appeal.

Guaranty argues that the Colorado statute is

distinguishable and that Colorado case law should therefore not
be followed.

(Resp. Br. at 27-28.)

However, the only

distinction is that the Colorado statute gives all mechanics'
liens priority from "the time of the commencement of work,"
while the Utah statute gives priority from "the time of the

-7-

commencement to do work c^r furnish materials on the ground."
Cf. Colo. Rev. Stat. §38-22-106(1)(1973) with U.C.A. §38-1-5.
Thus, the Utah statute merely adds an alternative attachment
point, which has no effect on architects' liens.

Colorado case

law is accordingly relevant and persuasive.
Regarding relevant case law from other jurisdictions,
Guaranty attempts to snow the Court with decisions that are not
on point.

(Resp. Br. at 21-22.)

Of the five cases on which

Guaranty places primary reliance, three do not even deal with
priority of architects' liens, and the statutes of four of the
jurisdictions are materially distinguishable from Utah's.
Williams & Works, Inc. v. Springfield Corp., 408 Mich. 732, 293
N.W.2d 304, 305 (1980), holds that a lien for off-site
engineering services is inferior to a mortgage under a statute
requiring "commencement of said building or buildings, erection,
structure or improvement."

Reuben E. Johnson Co. v. Phelps, 279

Minn. 107, 156 N.W.2d 247, 250-51 (1968), held that a mortgage
has priority over liens for surveying work under a statute
measuring priority "from the time the first item of material or
labor is furnished upon the premises for the beginning of the
improvement."

And Clark v. General Electric Co., 243 Ark. 399,

420 S.W.2d 830, 833 (1967), held that a mortgage has priority
over liens for preliminary site preparation under a statute
giving priority from the "commencement of the buildings or
improvements."

Walker v. Lytton Savings and Loan Ass'n, 84 Cal.

Rptr. 521, 465 P.2d 497, 498-500 (1970), gives a mortgage lien

-8-

priority over an architect's lien because the California
priority statute measures lien attachment from "the time when
the building, improvement, structure, or work of improvement . .
. was commenced."

Only Aladdin Heating Corp. v. Trustees, 93

Nev. 257, 563 P.2d 82, 84 (1977), decides the issue of an
architect's lien priority under a statute reasonably comparable
to Utah's and Colorado's.

However, the court's rationale for

giving the trust deed priority was that architects' liens do not
even exist until after commencement of the planned building,
which is directly contrary to this Court's holding in Zions.

4

Thus, there is no majority and minority rule with regard
to the relative priority of architects' liens.

Each case

necessarily turns on the precise wording of the priority statute
of the particular jurisdiction.

Utah's statute most closely

resembles Colorado's; therefore, this Court should adopt the
position of the Colorado courts in giving architects' liens
priority from the date of commencement of the architectural work.

Guaranty lists a string cite of additional cases from
other jurisdictions supposedly holding that liens for
preconstruction architectural and engineering services do not
exist until commencement of visible, on-site construction.
(Resp. Br. at 22 n.7.) However, existence or attachment of
those liens prior to actual construction is not at issue in this
appeal. Zions specifically held that an architect's lien
attaches without regard to actual construction; therefore, that
corollary issue is settled under Utah law. None of those cited
cases decides the relative priority of an attached architect's
lien vis-a-vis a lender's trust deed.

-Q-

POINT II:

THE NOVEMBER 1982 FORECLOSURE JUDGMENT ON THE FEE
PROPERTY DOES NOT PRECLUDE RELATION BACK OF THE
ARCHITECTS1 LIENS TO VISIBLE, PRE-FORECLOSURE
IMPROVEMENTS ON THE LEASED AND PERMIT PROPERTIES.

Guaranty argues that the November 1982 foreclosure
judgment on the 110-acre fee parcel bars relation back of the
liens for post-foreclosure work to any pre-foreclosure work on
the fee parcel as well as the contiguous leased and permit
parcels comprising another 4541 acres.

(Resp. Br. at 31-33.)

Regarding relation back to pre-foreclosure work on the fee
property, Guaranty attempts to distinguish a foreclosure of
liens from the release of liens illustrated in First of Denver,
sujpra, and Duckett v. Olsen, 699 P. 2d 734 (Utah 1985).
discussion in App. Br. at 18-19.)

(See

While there are obvious

technical distinctions between a foreclosure and a release, they
have no legal significance in resolving the relation back
issue.

In either circumstance, a lien for subsequent work

relates back to the date of previous work for which the lien has
been extinguished.
Even assuming liens for post-foreclosure architectural
work cannot relate back to pre-foreclosure work on the fee
property, they can certainly relate back to pre-foreclosure work
on the leased and permit parcels, which were unaffected by the
foreclosure.

(See App. Br. at 3 and Resp. Br. at 7-8 for

discussion and documentation of pre-foreclosure work on leased
and permit parcels.)

Guaranty argues in response that "material

abandonment" of the project precludes relation back to any
pre-foreclosure work.

(Resp. Br. at 32-34.)
-10-

However, Heritage

never "abandoned" the project, and the district court found no
abandonment.

Visible work on the project was suspended for, at

the most, five months following the November 1982 foreclosure.
The purpose of the suspension was for Heritage to obtain
long-term financing with which to reacquire the fee property and
continue with the project.

Aztec Engineering began surveying

and staking the property in April of 1983, and architectural and
construction work resumed in earnest after Heritage obtained
additional financing in June of 1983.
at 9.)

(App. Br. at 4; Resp. Br.

A five-month suspension of work on a twenty-year project

cannot be considered a "material abandonment" of the project.
Frank J. Klein & Sons, Inc. v. Laudeman, 270 Md. 152, 311 A.2d
780, 784-86 (1973) (fifteen-month suspension of construction did
not constitute abandonment).

Guaranty's reliance on U.C.A.

§38-1-11 is misplaced, as the issue here is not the timely
filing of a lien after abandonment, see 57 C.J.S., Mechanics1
Liens §144, but the relation back of a valid lien beyond a
period of temporary cessation, see id. §180.

Thus, under the

facts here, the architects1 liens may relate back to the visible
pre-foreclosure work on the leased and permit properties.

Guaranty does not challenge relation back of the
architects' liens to the visible post-foreclosure improvements
on the property. (See App. Br. at 19-20.)

-ii_

POINT III!

RESPONDENTS ARE PRECLUDED FROM CHALLENGING THE
EXTENT OF PROPERTY COVERED BY THE ARCHITECTS1 LIENS
BECAUSE THEY FAILED TO FILE A CROSS-APPEAL.

Guaranty argues that any liens held by the architects or
other mechanics extend only to the 41 acres of leased property
on which the resort headquarters was constructed, and not to the
fee or permit properties.

(Resp. Br. at 39-40.)

This argument,

of course, ignores the facts that (1) the architectural and
engineering services pertained and inured to the benefit of all
three parcels; and (2) even if the architects' liens take
priority through relation back to visible construction, that
construction occurred on all three parcels, not just the leased
parcel.
In any event, Guaranty is precluded from challenging the
scope of the architects' liens because it failed to file a
notice of cross-appeal.

The district courts' Ruling states:

The court notes that the architects and engineers do
have valid lien rights for the work they have done
subject to the priority determination as hereinabove
made, and that those liens apparently affect the overall
project and to the extent that they come subsequent to
the phase 1 ruling would be valid liens applying to all
of the property of the project. [Appellant's Add. at 5,
emp. added.]
Since Guaranty filed no cross-appeal from that portion of the
court's ruling, Guaranty cannot now challenge or seek to modify
the ruling to enlarge its own rights thereunder.

See, e.g,

Labrum v. Rickenbach, 711 P.2d 225, 227 (Utah 1985) (respondents
cannot seek to expand easement in absence of cross-appeal);
Mabey v. Kay Peterson Constr. Co., 682 P.2d 287, 292 (Utah 1984).
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CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, this Court should reverse the
district court's Ruling pertaining to the lien priority and hold
that the architects' liens are superior to Guaranty's trust deed.
DATED this _/£^day of May, 1988.
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